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Introduction: The politics of good governance in context 
It is well known that since the end of Cold War, African countries have experienced political 
changes from one party or military regimes towards multiparty regimes. These processes 
have internal as well as transnational dimensions. One of these dimensions is the politics of 
conditionality of aid institutions and the new emphasis on good governance in development 
discourse1. 
Some authors give an extraordinary importance to this phenomenon when try explain 
contemporary African politics. According to Rita ABRAHAMSEN, "the good governance 
discourse is an intrinsic part of the governance of the African continent by the North, and one 
of the ways in which contemporary international structures and relations of power are 
maintained and reproduced"2. 
This short paper about the relations between aid and political processes in Africa adopts a 
                                               
1 Georg SØRENSEN (ed.), Political Conditionality, Frank Cass, London / EADI, Geneva, 1993. 
2 Rita ABRAHAMSEN, Disciplining Democracy. Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa, Zed 
Books, London / New York, 2000. 
different approach. My aim is not to analyse how good governance is instrumentalist to the 
main world powers, but to study how international processes can affect in very different ways 
African politics, depending on the specific history and international connexions of distinct 
countries. Secondly, I would like to underscore how discourses, such as good governance, 
assume different relevance according to those circumstances. 
Aid is considered here as a part of the extraversion of African politics, described by Jean-
François BAYART3. With this concept we can understand how the dependency and unequal 
relationship with external environment, which characterised sub-Saharan political landscape, 
is one of the main resources in political actors' hands to maintain their power over their 
populations. My intention is to show how extraversion changes along time and space. For 
that, I concentrate in two distanced countries, Equatorial Guinea and Mozambique, whose 
comparison can be very useful to avoid too big generalisations, and, at the same time, can 
prove the existence of broad processes that affect many places in different ways. 
A secondary assumption, not quite developed here, is that Africans, and especially 
governmental elites, make use of international languages, such as good governance, to 
pursue their own agendas, in which survival becomes central4. 
 
Decolonisation 
The territorial states of Mozambique and Equatorial Guinea find their origins in their 
independence from two southern European countries, Portugal and Spain, characterised at the 
time by authoritarian government. Nevertheless, despite similarities in colonial imaginary and 
rule, both colonies suffered very different decolonisations.  
As I tried to show in my PhD dissertation, nationalists of Equatorial Guinea found in United 
Nations and the Afro-Asiatic movement a very convenient scenario to push Francoist regime 
against its phantoms of international isolation5. As a consequence, independence in 1968 was 
characterised by negotiation. For its part, the Portuguese decision to stand against retirement 
was contested in all its colonies by armed insurgencies that in the case of Mozambique were 
headed by one movement, the Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO). The independence 
in 1975 was thus obtained in great part, through a violent process. 
The international arena played, in both cases, a big part in the way and the results that 
assumed decolonisation, though in different ways. In Equatorial Guinea the United Nations 
fostered a negotiated exit to the colonial tension, and promoted a unified independence 
between the two parts of the territory (Bioko Island and Río Muni, in the mainland). In 
Mozambique, the colonial war made of decolonisation a regional process, at the time when 
Cold War was entering Southern Africa. During conflict, FRELIMO defined its main foreign 
alliance with Tanzania or the communist block, and its compromise with the end of its 
neighbour white regimes. 
                                               
3 Jean-François BAYART, "Africa in the World. A history of Extraversion", African Affairs, 99, 2000. 
4 Christopher CLAPHAM, Africa and the International System. The Politics of State Survival, Cambridge Studies 
in International Relations, Cambridge U.P., 1996. 
5 Alicia CAMPOS SERRANO, De colonia a estado: Guinea Ecuatorial, 1955-1968, Centro de Estudios Políticos y 
Constitucionales, Madrid, 2002. 
 
Modernisation and authoritarianism during Cold War 
After independence, governments of Equatorial Guinea and Mozambique adopted 
modernisation language as part of their legitimacy. Modernisation justified in part the 
establishment of authoritarian regimes in both countries, though they adopted very different 
character.  
Whereas in Mozambique the compromise with social transformation of FRELIMO nationalist 
elite was quite strong, in Equatorial Guinea modernisation was almost rhetoric. It hardly 
justified few investments in infrastructures, whereas colonial economy collapsed and 
Guinean families concentrated on subsistence farming. If the state administration subsisted 
was due to some international aid from the old colonial power, France and socialist countries, 
USSR and China. A never clarified coup d'etat justified the imposition of a terror government 
by the elected president, Macías Nguema, in March 1969, five months after independence. 
The repression reached the old colonial as well as the nationalist elite, and terror and fear 
became the main instrument of power. The state was restructured along Nguema's family, 
making Guinean politics a family affair6. Disorder, as Chabal and Daloz put it, prevailed over 
any other political articulation. And the opposition was hardly able to create a movement in 
exile, ANRD, which rallied little international support. 
In Mozambique, modernisation project was much more incorporated to FRELIMO's struggle, 
and since 1977 it was expressed in the language of Marxism7. The postcolonial government 
tried to implement effective politics to transform the rural economic structure, similarly to 
those of TANU in Tanzania. This social engineering required the centralisation of all power 
in the party and the elimination of alternative authorities. The resistance of part of the 
population provided some social support to the guerrilla movement created by Rodhesia 
regime, which started a civil war in 1978. All this encouraged FRELIMO's authoritarianism, 
which was justified in the need of national unity against the foreign threat and modernisation 
against recalcitrant traditionalism. 
The international insertion of both states was also very different, despite initial similarities. 
Old colonial powers, Portugal and Spain, due to their weakness and the way independence 
was reached, lost most of their influence and economic presence after their withdrawal. New 
international connections appeared which included in both cases socialist countries, specially 
the Soviet Union and China. And international norms related to self-determination and 
sovereignty played also a big part supporting the new postcolonial states8. 
But this was most obvious in the case of Equatorial Guinea, where international norms 
claimed in United Nations had helped to end colonialism. International recognition was not 
made dependent on the effective participation of the population in the state, and new 
independent government could allege sovereignty and non-intervention principles to justify 
and to reject any external criticism to the repression of internal dissidence. Postcolonial 
                                               
6 Patrick CHABAL & Jean-Pascal DALOZ, Africa works. Disorder as political instrument, James Currey, 1999. 
7 João GOMES CRAVINHO, Modernizing Mozambique: FRELIMO Ideology and the FRELIMO State, PhD 
Thesis, University of Oxford, Trinity 1995; Margaret HALL & Tom YOUNG, Confronting Leviathan. 
Mozambique since Independence, Hurst & Co., London, 1997. 
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opposers did not find in the international norms the support that anti-colonial nationalists had 
found.   
In Mozambique, on the contrary, the principle of non-intervention did not help the new 
government to avoid foreign interference. The white regimes in Southern Rhodesia and 
Southafrica that surrounded the new independent country supported an internal guerrilla 
army, RNM-RENAMO, in order to destabilise a FRELIMO government in which anti-
colonial and anti-apartheid movements, ZANU and ANC, found a firm backer.  
In summary, if in Equatorial Guinea international norms such as the principle of non-
intervention and the international aid uphold a government based on fear and repression, in 
Mozambique the violation of these same principles by Rhodesia and Southafrica did not help 
the rights and liberties of Mozambicans. On the contrary, it contributed to a conflict that 
impoverished the country and killed hundreds of thousands people. 
 
Aid and the politics of adjustment 
At the beginning of the 1980s, all these economic and political dynamics brought the 
postcolonial states to a crisis that was economic as well as of legitimacy. New international 
actors appeared in Africa, specially the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 
which, in exchange to their finance support, demanded the almost complete change of the 
nationalist approach to development. The neoliberal orthodoxy demanded the end of the state 
as the main promoter of modernisation and advocated for the markets as main instruments to 
go out the crisis and meet development goals. 
During the liberal moment of the 1980s, our two countries suffered a certain rapprochement 
towards western countries. In Equatorial Guinea, the nephew of the dictator, Teodoro Obiang 
Nguema, gave a palace coup against his uncle in 1979 and breaded expectations of 
democratisation and new affluence of western aid. In fact, multilateral and bilateral aid flew 
to the country. The new government signed an agreement on friendship and cooperation with 
old colonial power, Spain, which sent numerous Spanish technicians to the old colony during 
the 1980s. United Nations helped to organise two conferences in 1982 and 1988 with a 
Round Table of Donor Countries, where they adopted an economic development program. 
Equatorial Guinea entered the Franco CFA zone in 1988 and the multilateral agreements 
between EU and ACP countries. Finally, the government accepted an IMF proposal of 
Structural Adjustment Plan in 1988. During these years, aid became the main resource of the 
state, for economic activity was not reactivated. 
None of international aid programs was directed to the strengthening of democratic 
institutions, and its disbursement was not conditional to the effective respect of human rights. 
Actually, unconditional aid facilitated that Obiang government did not entail a real change in 
social and political structures, which were maintained under Nguema family's control. Only 
political assassinates became less frequent; but poverty and repression kept being used by 
governments to assure their preponderance.  
In Mozambique, FRELIMO government began to transform its economic and foreign politics 
after the IV Party Congress in 1983. Since then, FRELIMO started to abandon its model of 
society and regional relations, and adopted politics of economic liberalisation, as a way to 
make new economic resources from international financial institutions available. At the same 
time, in 1984, Mozambique and South Africa signed the Nkomati agreement, with which 
Maputo, promising the closure of ANC headquarters in the country, aspire to put an end to 
South African support of RENAMO. After President Samora Machel death in an unclear 
accident in 1986, Joaquim Chissano reinforced the economic conversion of FRELIMO, and 
in 1987 adopted a program of structural adjustmen (Programa de Recuperaçao Economica-
PRE). Its basic aims were the promotion of agriculture and the reduction of public 
expenditure. 
However, neither the Nkomati agreement nor the structural adjustment reached their aims. 
RENAMO kept receiving support from Pretoria, and the liberal economic policies did not 
promote a significance growth, whereas inflation and reduction of social services affected 
gravely to the population. What happened was an extraordinary growing of aid and 
humanitarian programs in the country, which permitted the FRELIMO government to 
survive, but at the same time diminished the government capacity to control the economic 
decisions and design the development strategies. 
 
Democracy and aid in early 90s 
The political changes that experienced the African countries after the end of Cold War also 
affected our two cases. The new attitude of donors, more favourable towards democracy, and 
the winds of change in the continent, pushed the government of Equatorial Guinea to draw a 
new constitution in 1991 establishing a multiparty system with periodic elections for the 
legislative assembly, the presidency and the town councils. Many political parties were 
recognised, and in 1993 they and the party in power, PDGE, signed a National Pact. 
However, at the same time, the government developed new forms of repression and co-
optation against the now recognised opposers. Many of them were detained and tortured. And 
the government learnt how to manipulate the elections and its results, and to intimidate the 
citizens to force them to desist from participating in political activities. 
International donors replied to the halt of the political transition9. Spanish government retired 
most of its institutional aid programs in 1994 and the Clinton Administration closed the US 
embassy and the rural development programs of the Peace Corps two years later. Also in 
1996, IMF suspended its programs due to lack of accomplishment of fiscal measures and 
corruption. At the same time, the country was suffering the effects of the devaluation of franc 
CFA in August 1993. The economic crisis that followed pushed Equatorial Guinean 
government to ask again for foreign support. Donors, especially Spain, take advantage of the 
situation and conditioned the disbursement of aid to the fairness of next elections. Actually, 
local elections in September 1995 are considered the fairest of all celebrated since 1991, 
where opposition propose a joint list that won 19 out of 27 town councils (though 
government only recognised 9). 
In Mozambique, the democratic moment coincided with the negotiation and pacification 
process and the end of war between FRELIMO and RENAMO10. The diminishing of external 
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10 Alex VINES, Renamo. From Terrorismo to Democracy in Mozambique, The Eduardo Mondlane Foundation, 
Amsterdam / CSAS, University of York, 1996; Chris ALDEN, Mozambique and the Construction of the New 
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resources in the context of the end of apartheid and Cold War facilitated the positive attitude 
of government and guerrilla to finish the armed struggle and to recognise each other as 
legitimate political parties in an electoral contest. The Mozambican process was intensely 
penetrated by internal and international actors. The definite location of negotiations was the 
headquarters of Community of Saint Egidio, in Rome. And implementation of agreements 
(which suffered different problems and delays in relation to demobilisation of troops) was in 
charge of UN mission, ONUMOZ.  
The reform of the political system was one of the main pieces of the peace process. The 
government had approved a new constitution in November 1990, transforming the one party 
state in a multiparty system, in which the president and the parliament were elected by 
universal suffrage, and liberal rights were recognised. Rome agreements included an electoral 
law and the compromise to celebrate elections in 1993. Finally elections took place in 199411. 
FRELIMO won, for a small difference over RENAMO, first elections, which were accepted 
by United Nations despite accusations of intimidation during elections. Chissano obtained 
53,3% of votes, and Dhlakama 33,7%, whereas seats in parliament were distributed between 
FRELIMO 129, RENAMO 112 and União Democratica 9. Despite international pressures, 
president Chissano did not accepted the constitution of national unity proposed by donors as 
United States. 
The stability of new government was based on external resources. Aid became the main 
proportion of national budget, and it was also the mean by which RENAMO survived. In this 
context, international donors and development NGOs had reinforced its presence and its 
capacity in Mozambique, and constitute a powerful web of influence on the government, 
which is often compel to accept their programs and proposals to assure the continuity of the 
finance flow. 
 
Variations in African Extraversion: Oil and Aid dependencies 
The importance of aid for Mozambican politics contrasts with the situation of Equatorial 
Guinea since mid-90s. In 1994, the oil production in Equatorial Guinea waters started to grow 
sharply, from 17,000 bpd in 1996 to 371,700 bpd in 200412. The ascendancy of aid agents 
and diplomats was replaced by the influence representatives of big oil corporations, mostly 
Americans. These newly arrived economic groups turn to be far less interested in promoting 
democracy or human rights. The arrival of American businessmen at the time US embassy 
were closing and diplomats leaving is good symbol of all this. 
Oil production put an end to Equatorial Guinean aid dependency, and also to external 
democratisation pressures of early 1990s. In 2002, the mandate of the UN special 
representative for monitoring the human rights situation in Equatorial Guinea was not 
renewed, as a consequence of effective pressures of  the Guinean government. Despite the 
astonishing economic growth and the net diminution of aid resources, many multilateral and 
bilateral mechanisms has been reactivated. None of them has been conditioned to political 
reforms. In the new economic context, compromise of donors with democracy has 
                                               
11 The day before, the leader of RENAMO, A. Dhlakama, announced his withdrawal, provoking a vigorous 
response by the part of "international comunity", specially United Nations, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Italy and 
United States, who offered additional financing to Dhalakama. 
12 FMI Country Report 05/151, Republic of Equatorial Guinea: Statistical Appendix, May 2005. 
diminished13.  
In 1997 was celebrated a National Economic Conference, backed by donors, in which 
government approved an Economic Strategy for 1997-2001, with components of structural 
adjustment. Spain, main bilateral donor, transformed again its policy towards Equatorial 
Guinea after the discovery of oil In 1999, both government celebrated an new agreement on 
aid and co-operation (IX Comisión Mixta), focused on education and health, but without any 
"democratic clause". This was just afterwards a wave of repression against the Movement for 
Self-determination of Bioko Island and the celebration of legislative elections considered by 
observers as non-transparent. Spanish government has also accepted to cancel and renegotiate 
parts of the debt Equatorial Guinea had with it. Oil has become one interest more in addition 
to those traditional Spanish interests in that country: in 2003 Repsol got a contract to co-
exploit an oilfield. Finally, due to pressures by the part of Equatorial-Guinean government 
closed its radio programme dedicated to Equatorial Guinea, which was the only space of 
freedom of speech in the country.  
The political consequences of the new political economy are evident: the president has 
widened the politics of patronage and clietelism through distribution of part of oil rents. The 
biggest part of it, however, has gone to personal bank accounts abroad. As a consequence, 
opposition has suffered a periodic process of fragmentation and absorption by the party in 
power, and today only one party, CPDS, stands legally against the government. The enclave 
oil economy reinforces the state as the main social source of accumulation, and assists the 
government in its particular politics of disempowerment and impoverishment. Temptation to 
collaborate with the party in government to get a job or simply avoid police harassment is 
bigger and bigger since the discovery of oil. The so-called "Dutch Disease" has the effect of 
depressing other economic areas, and small producers and entrepreneurs only find obstacles 
to their economic activity, despite the favourable environment for big business.  
Elections since 1996 had been characterised by open frud. Electoral processes in 1996 
(presidential) and 1999 (legislative) had confirmed Obiang Nguema and PDGE in power. 
Opposition did not run for local elections in 2000. In December 2000 Obiang won again 
presidential elections with 97,7% of votes, after opposition candidate decided to renounce 
little before the end of voting day. All this happened at the same time that main opposition 
leader, Plácido Micó, and some other opposers were kept in jail, after a trial that Amnesty 
International and others human rights organisations considered unfair. Last local and 
legislative elections in April 2004 were as fraudulent as previous ones, and "public vote" of 
citizens dominated the voting. 
Despite the small interest of donors on democracy in Equatorial Guinea, there has recently 
appeared a new concern on other related issue: transparency. This was due to some 
pressures made by international advocacy organisations and campaigns −such as Global 
Witness or Publish What You Pay −, which denounce the connections between extraction of 
natural resources and human rights abuses14. The discovery that US$ 700 million of 
Equatorial Guinea's oil revenues had been placed in an account of an American Bank (Riggs') 
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under the direct control of President Obiang Nguema, was also denounced by the same US 
Senate. 
As a reaction, the Equatorial-Guinean government has shown a strong interest to participate 
in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative EITI of Tony Blair's government, and to 
get IMF certificate of transparency15. Though IMF considers that "(i)mportant progress has 
been made with regard to transparency and accountability of oil-related revenues and public 
finance" in its 2005 Public Information Notice for Equatorial Guinea, organisations such as 
Global Witness are trying to make conditional Equatorial Guinea participation in 
international initiatives to real participation of civil society in them. The efficacy of these 
international pressures to the country democracy and politics is something to be seen in the 
future.  
In Mozambique, the question of democracy adopts different lines. International donors have 
kept backing electoral process in Mozambique and economic and institutional reforms. Aid 
constitutes the bigger part (40%) of GDP, which gives international agencies a big capacity to 
define government politics, and debtors had cancelled big part of Mozambican debt since 
1996, when it entered to take part in the HIPC Initiative. The paradox of democracy in 
Mozambique is that at the same time that international actors make pressures on FRELIMO 
to respect the rules of the democratic game, they try to impose politics and programs not 
socially agreed. Liberal economic policies have been deepen and have favoured external 
inversions (especially South African) in agriculture, tourism or infrastructures, as well as the 
conversion of part of the political elite in a new national bourgeoisie.  
Many authors consider that this situation undermines Mozambican sovereignty, so much 
defended by FRELIMO in its initial nationalist project16. But others emphasise the fact that 
FRELIMO maintains control of the state thanks to a remarkable use of language of 
democracy and reconstruction, of mechanisms of patronage and clientelism and of the need 
that donors have of a "success story"17. At the same time, RENAMO obtained part of the 
peace dividends and electoral participation in form of external financing. 
Benefits of all these reforms for the majority of population had been less spectacular. The end 
of civil war allowed people to come back to their places and economic activities, to move 
freely and to have access to the few social services by the government, the RENAMO and the 
international NGOs. But the persistence of poverty, worsened by cycles of draught and 
flooding, did not favour the capacity of people to participate in public affairs. For its part,  
electoral democracy has been faulty, as RENAMO did not run for 1998 local elections and 
accused of fraud 1999 presidential and legislative elections. Abstention has been very high in 
local elections in November 2003 and presidential and legislative in November 2004. 
Clientelistic and patronage webs, dominated by FRELIMO and in lesser extent by 
RENAMO, greatly condition political participation. 
In this context, the great implication of donors in Mozambican political process makes good 
governance one of the express aims with which they justify their presence in the country. The 
language of good governance works more as a compensatory and balancing discourse of the 
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17 Chris ALDEN, Mozambique and the Construction of the New African State. From Negotiations to Nation 
Building, Palgrave, 2001. 
effects provoked by neoliberal economic policies than a coherent part of it. Good governance 
inspires programs to assist institutions, looking to strength as well as to reform the state. The 
state that donors want to develop is one more efficient, with more territorial presence and a 
facilitator of market relations. One of the most sensitive and controversial programs of good 
governance in Mozambique is the reform of the Justice sector. The aim of the Justice reform 
is double: (1) to improve the juridical security for national and international business; (2) to 
address the violations of human rights in prisons and police stations, as well as the difficulties 
for ordinary citizens to reach the Tribunals18.  
These programs of good governance have some contradictory aims: they seek to assist the 
state and at the same time the civil society that should control it. This has created a space for 
Mozambican civil society −religious churches, lobbying organisations or NGOs− that have 
got some autonomy from state due to external finance. But, at the same time, the external 
finance is strengthening the role of population as beneficiaries and clients more than citizens. 
There is also an evident contradiction between demands of democratisation and the fact than 
meetings between government and donors are more important than decisions in Parliament. 
The abstention in late general elections confirms the general perception among population 
that their votes are rather useless to decide politics. 
 
Conclusions 
The dependency of African governments on external resources, and their role as gatekeepers 
between international processed and clientelist internal networks19, do not favour democratic 
participation of citizens on public affairs. As far as governments do not fully depend on their 
population for the survival of the state, the relashionship between rulers and citizens is not 
mainly based on the respect of their rights, and fear and disorder may become main 
instruments of social control. 
This notwithstanding, and as we have seen through the comparison of two cases, extraversion 
in African politics suffers numerous variations in time and space. The relevance of 
international connections makes African states very sensitive to transformations in the 
international arena. One of these late transformations has been the emergence of political 
conditionality of development aid. Other variations refer to the particular insertion of 
countries in economic international currents: the possession of oil greatly differentiates 
Equatorial Guinea's extraversion from that of Mozambique, where aid has become state's 
main resource. 
The different kind of extraversions can affect differently to African democracy or the 
capacity of African people to participate in the public domains. It could be thought that when 
the main resource of the state is aid, and the hegemonic language of aid industry is good 
governance, it can make donors a factor of greater democratisation. 
But the efficiency of international efforts to promote democracy, through the conditioning of 
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19 Frederick COOPER, Africa since 1940. The past of the present, Cambridge U.P., 2002. 
aid is proving to be quite limited. The main reason is precisely that aid forms part of the 
extraversion of the African state, which is at the same time base of the autocracy in Africa. 
Political conditionality and programs of institutional strengthening not only do not question 
the extraversion of the government but on the contrary, they foster it. Therefore they do not 
provide enough stimuli for African governments to empower their population.  
The limits of democratisation through aid are expressed in different ways. The concept of 
democracy considered in the processes of political conditionality or the programs of good 
governance is quite partial, usually too centred on elections. In this circumstances, democracy 
is becoming a kind of sham, and liberty language, a fictitious discourse, in a way it seems as 
if African rulers and foreign donors had tacitly agreed to trivialise the transformative 
potential of democratic freedoms20. Despite this new relevance of institutions for 
development discourse, it still promotes depolitization of African problems so well described 
by James Ferguson21. 
There are also many contradictions between political and economic demands: simultaneously 
to requesting democratisation, donors try to impose economic policies that would not 
probably get the general consent of population if asked. Finally, external pressures can be 
very random as there exist conflicting interests by the part of donor states, which included not 
only or mainly development or democracy, but economic benefits, control of immigration or 
diplomatic support in international fora. That is obvious in Equatorial Guinea, where oil has 
become the main aim of foreign countries. 
Nevertheless, when extraversion is based on exploitation of a natural resource and this makes 
aid unnecessary, pressures for democratisation became even less efficient. Enclave 
economies generated by oil or diamonds disempower populations more than aid does. Only 
the emergence of advocacy campaigns on issues such as human rights or transparency can 
countervail the interests of powerful transnational actors at the international level. For its 
part, and independently of conditionality, aid can generate spaces of participation and 
personal survival aside from the state. In cases as Mozambique, the presence of international 
aid agencies seems to favour certain consensus in relation to the rules of the political game 
and respect of human rights. The effects of all this on democracy is still to be seen. 
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